Hooker's division suffered heavy casualties in the Peninsula campaign as well as in the Second Battle of Bull Run. As a result, it was assigned to the defense of Washington for the next several months. This caused Carr's brigade and the 115th Pennsylvania to miss the Battle of Antietam, one of the most brutal battles of the war, several weeks later. Of all the battles of the Army of the Potomac, Antietam was the only one of consequence missed completely by the 115th from the time it went to the front in July 1862 until the end of the war. The 115th was a recipient of good luck in this instance. It was rested because it was part of a unit that suffered heavy casualties during the Peninsula Campaign and Second Manassas, but having arrived too late to participate in the Peninsula Campaign, it did not suffer the great casualties suffered during that campaign by most other regiments.

The regiment spent all of September and October 1862 in camp near Alexandria. The only outstanding event revealed by the company reports was a review by President Lincoln of a body of troops which included the 115th. At some point during the Third Corps' stay at Alexandria, General Dan Sickles was placed in command of the Corps, Hooker having gone on to command a corps which remained active during September and October.

While the 115th and its division remained in camp, the bloody battle of Antietam occurred on September 17, 1862. This battle stopped Lee's first attempt to advance into Pennsylvania (the second would be Gettysburg). To Lincoln's dismay, however, McClellan did not follow up on his success at Antietam, allowing Lee's army to retreat back into Virginia. Lincoln's dissatisfaction with McClellan finally led him to remove McClellan as Commander of the Army of the Potomac on November 5, 1862, replacing him with General Ambrose Burnside.

On November 14, 1862, soon after Burnside acceded to command, he reorganized the Army of the Potomac into three "grand divisions." The Third Corps, together with the Fifth Corps, was placed in the Center Grand Division, under General Hooker. The 115th Pennsylvania was part of the Third Brigade of Sickles' Second Division. The brigade commander was at first General Francis Patterson, followed by General Joseph Revere. In the brigade with the 115th were the same regiments as at Manassas: the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th New Jersey and the 2d New York.

Earlier, during the first ten days of November, the regiment had been involved in a movement which had tragic consequences for the brigade commander, General Francis Patterson, brother of Colonel Robert Patterson of the 115th. On October 31, the Third Corps was ordered by McClellan to proceed toward Thoroughfare Gap in order to cut off any Confederate retreat in that direction.(1) Sickles' division (including the 115th) was accordingly sent out with two days' rations in packs, and five more days' rations in wagons.(2) Part of Sickles' division was directed to stay at Fairfax, Centreville, Manassas Junction, and along the railroad to guard the railroad and supply trains. These orders came late in the afternoon of October 31. The Quartermaster's Corps must have had to act hurriedly in order to get that many rations ready and distributed as required, but this seems to have been a normal occurrence during the war.  On November 1, the division left camp, and was on the march by midday, proceeding along Little River Pike.(3)

By the morning of November 2, the division had passed Fairfax Court House; it was past Centreville by 3:00 p.m., and that evening it stopped and made camp between Bull Run and Manassas Junction.(4) It arrived at Manassas Junction the next day, relieving the brigade of Siegel's corps which had been stationed there. On the following day, November 3, Sickles sent Patterson's division, including the 115th, forward in the direction of Warrenton Junction.(5) That same day, Sigel reported that his cavalry had driven the Confederates out of Thoroughfare Gap. Company reports of the 115th indicate that by November 5, the regiment had proceeded only as far south as Bristoe Station.

A few days later, there was apparently no question that the railroad could be used as far south as Warrenton Junction. Patterson's division on November 7 had advanced to Catlett's Station, several miles beyond Warrenton Junction. However, on the following day, Patterson felt the need to pull his division all the way back to Bristoe Station. Sickles claimed that this withdrawal by Patterson was "without orders, inconsistent with his instructions, and, so far as I can learn, without sufficient reason."(6) As a result, Sickles relieved Patterson, placing Col. Revere of the 7th New Jersey in command of the brigade. Sickles reported that Patterson was "very ill." Finally, Sickles called for an inquiry into Patterson's conduct, a recommendation with which Heintzelmann agreed. Some days later, Patterson died in his tent; the official version is that his weapon accidentally went off while he was cleaning it. He had never been well enough to command his division during any battle, and some have suggested that his problem was alcoholism. Whatever the reason for Francis Patterson's sad demise, there is probably little question that this event caused his brother Robert to resign as colonel of the 115th Pennsylvania several weeks later. He wrote Governor Curtin that "[c]ircumstances sad enough in their nature have compelled me to tender the resignation of my command."(7) Thus the regiment lost its best officer without ever having him in command during a major engagement.

On November 10, the division returned to Manassas Junction. On November 14th, Sickles was advised to be on the alert for a possible major cavalry attack from the direction of Berryville (near Winchester). Nothing came of this, but by November 16, Sickles' troops were fanned out over a wide area, with the 115th remaining at Manassas Junction.

Burnside had only been in command of the Army of the Potomac for a few days when, in response to Lincoln's request to come up with a plan, he proposed to follow Lee's army to Richmond, crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. In mid-November, Burnside requested pontoons and other similar items which would enable the army to cross the Rappahannock once it arrived there.

On November 16, Sickles' division, along with the rest of the Center Grand Division, was ordered to proceed in the direction of Fredericksburg, stopping the first night in Bealeton. Apparently the division did not actually leave for several days: the company reports show no movement until November 19, and that was a march toward Wolf Run Ford, a ford across the Occoquan south of Fairfax and east of Manassas Junction. By November 22, Sickles reported that his division was in place at Union Mills, a ford across Bull Run near Wolf Run Ford, where the division remained until November 24. On that day, the division began marching toward Falmouth, a small town just upstream from Fredericksburg. Passing through Dumfries and Stafford, the division reached Falmouth on November 28.(8) From Dumfries to Falmoth, the division probably took the road now known as U.S. 1.

In the meantime, even before the Fredericksburg battle got underway, the resignation of Col. Patterson created a vacancy which was not immediately filled. The second in command, Robert L. Thompson, had also resigned, apparently as a result of health problems.(9) The third in command, Major Frank A. Lancaster, was the only field officer left, but his arm had been shattered at Bristoe Station, and he was not yet recovered sufficiently to take command. For purposes of the impending battle of Fredericksburg, the regiment was placed under the command of Lt. Col. William A. Olmsted of the 2d New York, another regiment in the same division as the 115th Pennsylvania. Olmsted, to judge from his steady rise in command responsibility throughout the war, was apparently a capable officer.

In early December, not long before the battle of Fredericksburg, two factions began promoting their respective favorites to fill the vacancy in the colonelcy which would occur once Patterson's resignation became official. The competing officers were First Lt. William C. Ward, who had served as Col. Patterson's adjutant, and John P. Dunne, the captain in command of Company B. Ward was senior to Dunne by several months, while Dunne was senior to all other captains in charge of regiments. In time, both would command the regiment.

Ward's supporters petitioned the Governor on December 8, 1862. Ward's candidacy had the support of at least five of the nine company commanders. Officers from Companies D, E, G, I and K supported Ward, as did a second lieutenant from Company B, Dunne's own company. These officers also claimed that their support of Ward "faithfully represent[ed] [the wishes] of a large majority of the enlisted men of the Regiment."(10) Ward was praised as "eminently qualified . . . and by far the most efficient Officer in the Regiment, the only one in fact, in whom both Officers and men have that perfect confidence which it is so essential, a Commanding Officer should possess." Engaging in a bit of negative campaigning, these officers also noted that "[i]n the absence of all our Field Officers, the General commanding our brigade, being fully aware of the inefficiency of our Senior Captain [Dunne], was forced to place a Lieutenant Colonel [Olmsted] of a New York Regiment in command of our Regiment."

Certainly the decision to import a commanding officer rather than promote Dunne suggests that he was not the best officer available for the job. Col. Patterson also had something to say about Dunne. Writing the Governor on December 16, 1862 Patterson praised Ward, and warned against promoting Dunne, claiming that "[h]e is not fit for any position higher than the one that he now occupies. The men do not respect him and would be disgusted were he promoted."(11)  This estimation of Dunne was to prove all too correct a year later, as will be seen.

Dunne's partisans came from Companies A, B, C and F. In a letter written a day after the one in support of Ward, and using rather bombastic prose, they pointed out that the regiment had in it "340 men well disciplined and in high spirits ready and willing to meet the enemy whenever required."(12)  They asserted that they were "anxious to be in a fitting condition to meet the enemies of our country and to add one more laurel to the brow [of] old Keystone." Stretching things quite a bit, they claimed that Dunne's appointment would be "received with satisfaction by almost every Officer of the Regiment." This is a rather outlandish claim, since Ward was endorsed by more officers than was Dunne. Dunne's partisans then claim that when the Juniata was shelled on the James River in July 1862, Dunne's "coolness and soldierly qualifications" prevented the loss of over 100 lives. The letter also notes that at Malvern Hill, Dunne's "coolness under fire" was complimented by his colonel. However, that colonel, Robert Patterson, had said at the time that at Malvern Hill "we were not subjected to any further semblance of an action than having a few shells dropped among us,"(13) so it is not clear how much praise Patterson would have been inclined to bestow at that moment.

The outcome of this competition for the regimental command was that Ward was promoted to the command on January 15, 1863. About a month later, Dunne was promoted to Major, perhaps as sort of a consolation prize or in recognition of his seniority.. Ward, however, never actually went on to command the regiment in battle. On April 13, 1863, he resigned for reasons not presently known. By this time, Major Frank A. Lancaster had apparently recovered from his Bristoe wounds. On February 21, he had been promoted to colonel; perhaps he was given command of the regiment at that time, prompting Ward's eventual resignation, Ward never having held a rank higher than that of lieutenant colonel. According to General Carr, writing of Lancaster after his death at Chancellorsville, Lancaster was promoted to command of the regiment "for his gallantry in [the Bristoe Station] engagement."(14)

To return to the impending battle of Fredericksburg, the regiment, which in late November had arrived at Falmouth (across the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg), simply bided its time in camp there with the rest of the Army of the Potomac. Burnside was awaiting the arrival of the pontoons which would allow the river to be crossed and Fredericksburg to be attacked. However, by November 30, the Confederates had reached Fredericksburg and entrenched there. The Union hope of arriving at the Rappahannock first and getting across without a fight was made impossible because the needed pontoons and similar supplies did not reach Burnside in time.

As will be seen, the 115th had little to do in this battle, which was just as well in light of its terrible outcome for the Union. The main part of the battle took place on December 13, when Union troops crossed the river over pontoon bridges and met with heavy fire from the entrenched Confederates who were at higher elevations and could shoot down at the Federals. This was the battle in which General Lee, watching from a height as Union soldiers fell, said, "It is well that war is so terrible! We should grow too fond of it." The Union took over 12,000 casualties, while the Confederates lost only about a third as many.

On the following day, the Confederates waited all day in the hope that the Union attack would be renewed, but Burnside, finding that even his most aggressive commanders wanted no more of this fight, declined to send the troops back in. On the night of December 14-15, the Union troops pulled back, re-crossing the Rappahannock, and left the Confederates to awake finding nothing of their enemy on the former battlefield.

Sickles' division, including the 115th, had moved out of its camp at 7:00 on the morning of December 11, two days before the battle. While the camp was said to be at Falmouth, it must have been on the far side of that town, because there are several references to marches of ten or twelve miles. The division had been issued four days' cooked rations. This march ended about two weeks of tense monotony in camp.

On the 11th, the division did not march far. Stopping near General Sumner's headquarters,

The men rested on their arms during the day, impatiently looking for the completion of the bridges, which had been obstinately resisted by a small force of the enemy, posted in the city near the river bank. We bivouacked for the night in the same order and position, meanwhile replenishing our haversacks with rations for another day.(15)

On the following day, the 12th, the division did little for most of the day, but at about 4:00 p.m., it was sent four miles downriver via the Telegraph Road to the bridges which would be used by Franklin's Left Grand Division the next day. Sickles noted that "[a]lthough this march of about 4 miles was over tiresome roads and plowed fields, the men, in their eagerness for the advance, moved at a brisk pace, which brought us at dusk to our bivouac, on the ridge overlooking the river." Since dusk could not have occurred much later than 5:00, the march must have indeed been "brisk." The 115th bivouacked in the woods; its commanding officer noted that the day's march had been "bad marching."(16)

The battle got underway the next day, December 13.  A major part of the action on its eastern side, the vicinity of the 115th, occurred between 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m. Sickles' division, which was being used as a reserve, apparently did not cross the Rappahannock until about 2:00 p.m., although some reports state that the division crossed in the morning. In any event, once across, Revere's Third Brigade, which included the 115th, was the rearmost reserve brigade. It formed a line of battle in a sunken road behind the First and Second Brigades. General Revere noted that "During this time a heavy action was progressing on our right at Fredericksburg, and on our left, while the enemy appeared to be massing troops in our front."(17)

From this vantage point near the river, the division was spared the carnage which was going on elsewhere. Of the 12,000-plus casualties suffered by the Union, Sickles' entire division only had 100, and the entire Third Brigade reported only 2. The 115th Pennsylvania remained near the river all day until about 11:00 that night, when it was ordered to relieve one of the regiments guarding the two lower pontoon bridges.(18) The regiment stayed at this guard position all night; Olmsted noted that "[n]othing unusual occurred, except a great quantity of straggling officers and soldiers trying to cross."(19) The regiment prevented these crossings, whose occurrence was probably the reason for the regiment's being posted there.

The next day, December 14, was the day when the generals were debating whether to renew the attack. The 115th was ordered back to the brigade line along the sunken road near the river, where it "received a great number of shells and solid shot from the enemy on our flank, but no one was injured. One man out of ranks after water was hit in the hand by a shell."(20) That evening, the regiment went into bivouac; at 11:00 p.m., it was ordered to fall in and did so, but fifteen minutes later, that order was countermanded, and the regiment remained in bivouac the rest of the night.

On December 15, several companies were sent out on picket duty. That night at 10:00, the regiment began to fall back in the direction of the bridges, and later that night it crossed back over to the Union side of the Rappahannock. The bivouac that night was near the river. On the following day, the regiment returned to its camp at Falmouth.

The very limited role of the regiment at Fredericksburg should be contrasted with the description found in Bates. That author, perhaps relying on an account by a member or officer of the regiment, stated that "[a]s the line advanced across the plain, south of the road, it came under a terrific enfilading fire of shot and shell, from which it was forced to fall back to the road."(21) The 1913 book Philadelphia in the Civil War contains a similar statement, perhaps taken from Bates, to the effect that the regiment "was under heavy and long-continued fire in the course of Hooker's attack, near Franklin Crossing."(22) These somewhat glorified accounts of the regiment's role bear only the faintest resemblance to what the regiment actually encountered. Perhaps the best that can be said is that the regiment was prevented from advancing because of heavy fire, but the contemporary accounts all seem to agree that the regiment had the good fortune to be at a good distance from the slaughter which was occurring on the front lines.

Beyond question, the good fortune of the regiment was continued with its role in this engagement. The entire five or six days out of camp had cost the Union over 12,000 casualties, but the 115th did not share in that loss. About six months later, on May 7, 1863, the Philadelphia Daily Age listed three men in the regiment wounded at Fredericksburg: Lieutenant E. Davis, Co. D., Corporal J.C. McClaskey (or McCloskey), also Co. D, and J. Hurrel, Co. I.(23) The Official Reports list only one man wounded, but this latter report may be more accurate.

During the five-month period beginning in early September 1862, and ending at the end of January 1863, the number of men present and on the rolls remained largely constant. There were about 460 on the roll during these months, and about 350 present for duty.

Very little happened in the next month. As January progressed, the Union leadership was of one mind that the large army should not sit idle in winter quarters, but instead should find another way to cross the Rappahannock and attack Lee. Accordingly, on January 20, 1863, the troops began marching toward the fords upstream from Fredericksburg. The weather had been unusually dry for January, but the rains began to come almost as soon as the troops began to march. The result was the "Mud March," three or four days of attempted marching through mud so deep that wagons sank to their hubs and men to their knees. The regiment's role in this activity, no doubt in common with many other infantry regiments, was to lay logs for corduroy roads to be used by artillery and ammunition wagons. At the end of the day on the 23rd, it was apparent that the march could make no progress, so Burnside ordered the troops back to the camp they had left. The report of Company C of the 115th Pennsylvania contains a rare statement which goes beyond the usual matter-of-fact tone of these reports. The writer noted that "[t]hese two months were the most fatiguing and disparaging of the soldier of any service we have heretofore seen."(24)

Upon its return to camp, the regiment was promptly sent out on picket duty. According to Bellard, whose regiment was similarly detailed, it rained again on January 27, "wetting us through to the skin, having no tents to shelter us."(25) Then, "[b]efore daylight of the 28th, it began to snow and came down in a good old fashioned style."(26) The regiment was relieved, and the men marched back to camp with snow blowing in their faces and mud on the ground.
 

This episode was the end of Burnside's career as commander. On January 25, the day after the Mud March ended, Lincoln appointed General Hooker commander of the Army of the Potomac.
 

For the 115th Pennsylvania, and indeed for most of the Army of the Potomac, very little happened for the next three months, just as little had happened for the prior six weeks. From the end of January 1863 until the Chancellorsville campaign began in late April, the army remained in camp near Falmouth.
 

The only recorded event of note which occurred during this period was the attempted burning of the railroad bridge at Rappahannock Station, about 15 miles upriver from the Falmouth encampment. This was accomplished by the entire brigade, now designated the Third Brigade (Mott's) of the Second Division (Carr). The brigade left camp in a "violent snow storm" on the morning of February 3 with three days' cooked rations. By midmorning of the following day, it had reached the vicinity of the bridge. The cavalry was the part of the army actually charged with burning the bridge; infantry units such as the 115th simply guarded the fords below the bridge. The cavalry was unable to do much damage to the bridge because its timbers were too damp and the cavalry did not possess enough incendiary material.(27) This failure is probably not particularly important, because the bridge could easily have been rebuilt in the three months before it would have any strategic significance. There is no question, however, that this foray was performed under harsh conditions. Mott noted that the operation "start[ed] in a severe snow-storm, which lasted all day, interspersed with hail and rain, raining all night and part of the next day, the next night being exceedingly cold, and on Saturday the sun coming out thawed the roads so that it was terrible marching, it may be called one of the most severe expeditions on the command that any troops have been called upon to perform."(28)
 

The rest of February, March and most of April were spent in camp, with only the usual drill and occasional postings on picket duty. Several reviews occurred in April: one by President Lincoln and General Hooker on April 8, another by General Mott on April 12, and a third by Governor Joel Parker of New Jersey on April 26.(29)
 

In addition to the competition for command of the regiment which occurred in early 1863, some other personnel matters also arose during this period. In early January 1863, Congressman Edward G. Webb of Philadelphia wrote Governor Curtin in support of promoting First Sergeant Michael Connelly to the vacant second lieutenancy. This was apparently a routine promotion under existing rules, and in fact was accomplished, but the tone of Webb's letter shows how much of a part politics played in the staffing of regiments at this stage of the war. Webb mentions that Connelly was a member of the family of Michael Maginnis, who had "at least one hundred and fifty men in his employ, and his strong will is the law with them," and that Connelly's promotion "will most assuredly bind this large interest to your Excellency's purposes." In case the point had not already been made plain enough, Webb stated that the promotion "will be a politically profitable one."(30) The promotion occurred, effective December 1862, but it is not known whether the promotion actually took place before Webb's letter. Connelly was promoted to First Lieutenant a year later, and to Captain shortly before mustering out in June 1865.
 

Another personnel incident involved the captaincy of Company E. In January 1863, Col. Patterson wrote the state Adjutant General in support of promoting Second Lt. William A. Reilly to the captaincy. The letter (perhaps aided by the efforts of Reilly's father, who visited the Adjutant General) achieved its results, because Reilly was soon promoted, retroactive to early October 1862. Patterson pointed out that the original captain of the regiment, Matthew Reilly, "never did a day's duty" in the field "and finally was discharged on account of ill health." Patterson further noted that the First Lieutenant, George W. O'Malley, who was seeking the captaincy for himself, "invariably gave up the command to the Second lieutenant and took his place as a file closer. In the action at Bristow he mysteriously disappeared, and it is believed in the regiment that he ran away. This is the unanimous report and one which I have never heard contradicted. This I do know[,] that he was never heard of until he turned up in Philadelphia." On the other hand, wrote Patterson, Lt. William Reilly "has commanded his company in every engagement and commanded it well. I have always found him intelligent, courteous and brave, and always ready to do his duty without watching. His company [E] while under his command was in the best order of any in the regiment. I regard him next to the Adjutant as the best officer at present with the regiment."(31) Lt. Col. Thompson, then in command of the regiment, endorsed this letter, noting at the bottom that "I heartily concur in the above recommendation."
 

A few days later, Reilly's father stopped by the recruiting station in Philadelphia to let First Lt. O'Malley know that Reilly had been promoted to captain. This drew an immediate letter from O'Malley to the Governor. O'Malley complained that Reilly was "promoted to the rank of Captain in the said Co. over me." O'Malley based his claim for promotion largely on formal seniority and on politics. He claimed that he was sent to the recruiting station in Philadelphia because "I was obliged to leave from injuries received in the Battle Field at Bristow Station Va. . . ." (The surgeon's injury report, however, perhaps reflecting the general opinion O'Malley ran away from that battle, describes his injury only as "badly bruised while marching through the woods at Bristoe Station," and did not even mention its seriousness or lack thereof.) He claimed to have filled his company to "over 100 men," a number which Bates indicates was never reached at any one time; only eight men were recruited into the company during O'Malley's three or four months at the recruiting station. O'Malley concludes by asking that the Governor "remember me for my service to the Country and my interest and exertion at your Election."(32) This appeal was unsuccessful, and O'Malley was dismissed in June 1863, probably without ever having rejoined the regiment.(33)
 

The last personnel action which generated correspondence during this period was less controversial. In March 1863, 65 enlisted men in Company D signed a petition urging the promotion of 1st Sergeant Evan Davis to 1st Lieutenant (there was no second lieutenant at the time, so no question of leapfrogging another officer). The 65 men probably amounted to everyone present. The promotion occurred on March 23, 1863, but just a few weeks later, Davis died of injuries received at Chancellorsville.
 

The three months in camp after the Mud March cost the regiment about 35 of its approximately 330 enlisted men present in late January. The reasons for this decline were no doubt a combination of disease and desertion, but the records have not yet been examined to determine the proportions between the two.
 

By the end of April, the regiment had been mustered for just one month short of a year. Its time had been marked mostly by camp life. It had just missed the Seven Day's battle, participated fully in Bristoe Station and Second Manassas, and was well to the rear during the Battle of Fredericksburg. Its eleven months of service had been marked by only a very few days of actual battle, but it was now about to meet its most serious challenge.
 
 
 
 
 

1. O.R. I, 19(2), p.517.

2. Id., p. 519.

3. Id., p. 526.

4. Id., p. 533.

5. Id., pp. 540-541.

6. Id., p. 562.

7. 12/16/62 letter, R.E. Patterson to Gov. A.G. Curtin (Pa. State Archives).

8. O.R. Supp., 61, p. 795.

9. Col. Patterson's December 16 letter to Gov. Curtin refers to the resignation of Lt. Col. Thompson. The official records list Thompson as discharged on surgeon's certificate about a month later, on January 15, 1863.

10. 12/8/62 letter of Curtis, et al. to Gov. Curtin (Pa. State Archives).

11. 12/16/62 letter, R.E. Patterson to Gov. A.G. Curtin (Pa. State Archives).

12. 12/9/62 letter of Cromley, et al. to Gov. Curtin (Pa. State Archives).

13. O.R. Supp. I, 2, p. 479 (Report of Col. Patterson).

14. O. R. I, 25(1), p. 448.

15. O.R. I, 21, p. 377 (Report of General Sickles).

16. O.R. I, 21, p. 391 (Report of Lt. Col. Olmsted of Second N.Y., commanding 115th Pennsylvania).

17. O.R. I, 21, p. 389 (Report of General Revere).

18. O.R. I, 21, p. 391 (Report of Lt. Col. Olmsted of Second N.Y., commanding 115th Pennsylvania).

19. Id.

20. Id.

21. Bates, History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, Vol. VI, p. 1210 (1869-1871).

22. Taylor, Frank H., Philadelphia in the Civil War (City of Philadelphia, 1913), p. 126.

23. Bates does not show a J. Hurrel in the 115th at all, but there is a John Hurrell in Co. I of the 38th Pennsylvania.

24. O.R. Supp. II, 61, p. 805 (Report of Company C).

25. Bellard, p. 198.

26. Id.

27. John Bigelow, Jr., Chancellorsville, p. 52 (Yale University Press, 1911).

28. O.R. I, 25(1), p. 8 (Report of General Mott).

29. O.R. Supp. II, 61, p. 814 (Report of Company G).

30. 1/2/1863 letter, Webb to Curtin (Pa. State Archives).

31. 1/15/1863 letter, Patterson to Adj. Gen. Russell (Pa. State Archives)(emphasis in original.

32. 1/24/1863 letter, G.W. O'Malley to Gov. Curtin (Pa. State Archives)(emphasis in original).

33. For reasons not yet discovered, O'Malley found himself confined in the Albany Penitentiary later in 1863. In October 1863, he was pardoned from serving the rest of his sentence, but at the same time was dishonorably discharged.