"To have fought with this brigade on May 3 is an honor which time cannot efface, and the proud satisfaction of having performed their duty to their manhood, their country, and their God is their reward."⁽¹⁾

    By late April 1863, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia had been in camp practically within sight of each other for over four months. The "grand division" organizational scheme of Burnside had been quickly eliminated by Hooker, who on February 5 reorganized the Army of the Potomac into seven corps; the 115th Pennsylvania was placed in the Third Corps under Sickles. It remained in the Second Division, with General Hiram G. Berry replacing Sickles in the division command, and in the same New Jersey brigade with Mott commanding.

    Hooker had greatly improved the morale of his troops, notably by causing better delivery of food to the camps. For soldiers who usually had to eat hardtack biscuits, soft bread was a major booster of spirits, and Hooker provided for a number of bakeries in the camps. Morale was also improved by the issuance of identifying Corps badges to be sewn on uniforms, typically on the flat top part of the cap. The badge of the Third Corps was a diamond, and the color of the Second Division's badge was white, as shown below.

    Thus a soldier of the 115th Pennsylvania would have worn a white diamond on the top of his cap. A diamond shape is integrated into the design of the of the monument of the 115th Pennsylvania at Gettysburg.

    While encamped at Falmouth, Hooker developed a plan by which his army, considerably outnumbering Lee's, would be able to obliterate the Confederates. The first step of the plan involved sending a large cavalry force under General Stoneman across the Upper Rappahannock toward Richmond, with a view toward destroying Confederate communications. Then Hooker would take the larger part of his army across the Rappahannock and the Rapidan above their junction, and begin moving east toward Lee's army. At the same time General Sedgwick would cross near Fredericksburg with a smaller force, and would supply pressure from what would then be Lee's rear.

    Military authorities generally concur that the plan was an excellent one which if properly executed could have achieved its desired result. As will be seen, however, there were flaws of execution, and the aggressiveness of the Confederates would soon provide the Union with a considerable surprise on the afternoon of May 2. General Lee had sensed Hooker's hesitation when Hooker placed his troops in a defensive position on May 1. Thus Lee sent Jackson around the Union forces, as shown in the schematic diagram below, allowing an unexpected Confederate attack on the evening of May 2 which sent the Union left into complete disarray.

    From the standpoint of the 115th Pennsylvania, the campaign began with several days of marching in different directions. The regiment left camp on the night of April 28, marching about three miles east with the brigade to the neighborhood of White Oak Church. (The beginning of the march had been planned for the morning, but it rained.) This march was away from the direction of Chancellorsville and instead took the regiment below Fredericksburg, still on the north side of the river; Sickles' Third Corps, which included the 115th Pennsylvania, was serving as a reserve demonstration unit in support of Sedgewick's Sixth Corps, which was intended to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg to take on whatever was left of the Confederate forces there and continue toward Chancellorsville.

    On the 29th the regiment marched two miles back in the direction from which it had come, and encamped until noon of the 30th. At this point, General Hooker decided that it was time for Sickles' Third Corps to proceed to the scene where the possibility of action was the greatest. Accordingly, beginning on the afternoon of the 30th and continuing through the following morning, the Third Corps marched to the west, covering the 25 miles to the United States Ford. The ford was crossed in the midafternoon of May 1. The Corps then encamped near earthworks in the vicinity of the Rappahannock River.⁽²⁾

    The Union troops were quite heavily laden at the start of this march. As Bellard put it, "we left camp with our houses and furniture on our backs."⁽³⁾ A report filed a few weeks after the battle confirms this:

    The total weight carried by each soldier was 45 pounds. It consisted of his knapsack, haversack, subsistence, and change of underclothing, overcoat or blanket, arms and accouterments, and one piece of shelter-tent. Eight days' short rations were carried on the person, stowed as follows: Five days' in the knapsack, and three days' in the haversack; 40 rounds of ammunition were carried in the cartridge-boxes, and 20 rounds in the pockets of the man's clothing.⁽⁴⁾

    Others estimated that with personal effects and other things included, the total average weight carried was 56 to 60 pounds.⁽⁵⁾ To make matters worse, the men also "were stiff from their long encampment, and had not the strength and hardiness that might have been acquired from practice marches."⁽⁶⁾ Some of the heavier clothing proved to be unnecessary, with the result that the men "lin[ed] the road with overcoats and other articles thrown away as too heavy or cumbersome to be borne."⁽⁷⁾ As one Quartermaster General reported, "[t]he impulse to throw off all impediments [when going into action] is almost irresistible."⁽⁸⁾

    By April 30, General Hooker was so pleased with the movement of his troops that he issued the following order, prematurely boasting of the outcome:

It is with heartfelt satisfaction the commanding general announces to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him.

    When the Third Brigade and the 115th Pennsylvania crossed the United States Ford on May 1, the brigade was ordered to send two regiments to the north side of the river to protect the supply train and to use the rest of the brigade to guard the pontoons on the river, throwing out pickets to the fords on the Rapidan. Part of the 115th Pennsylvania was assigned to this picket duty for the next 24 hours.

    May 2 was the day on which Jackson marched around and surprised the Union troops and, late in the afternoon, flanked the Union left, which had been occupied by the Eleventh Corps. The Third Corps had moved around quite a bit during May 2, but without the brigade of which the 115th Pennsylvania was a member. That brigade was by the ford doing picket duty and guarding pontoons throughout the eventful daylight hours of May 2.

    At about 9:00 or 10:00 that evening, the Third Brigade was ordered south to the front, a march of about four miles. It arrived at the front (along the Plank Road west of Chancellorsville) at about 1:00 or 2:00 on the morning of May 3, and there the men attempted to sleep for a few hours. If sleeping had not already been difficult enough in light of the probable pending battle, it was made even harder by the sound of the chopping of wood all night long; the chopping was being done by the Twelfth Corps, which was creating breastworks as quickly as it could.

    The reason for the sudden summons of the brigade to the front was that the Eleventh Corps had been flanked by Jackson and "had broke and run."⁽¹⁰⁾ As the brigade started down the road, it "came across the 11th corps, who were rushing from the front pell mell and so blocked up the road that we could not advance."⁽¹¹⁾ Another member of the Third Corps, Lt. George B. Winslow, Battery D, First New York Light Artillery, gave a fuller description:

    Here an indescribable scene of confusion and disorder presented itself. Our way was literally blocked with the artillery and infantry of the Eleventh Army Corps, who were flying to the rear apparently in the utmost terror, begging in many instances by word and gesture that nothing might impede their cowardly and disgraceful flight. To turn them out of the way, much less back, was impossible, and some time elapsed before we could advance, and then only by turning into the field to the left of the road.⁽¹²⁾

    Mott's Third Brigade, even though summoned to the line of battle, was still intended to be used as a reserve. As Sickles stated,

[a]t about 2 a.m. the Third (Mott's) Brigade arrived from the ford, from whence it was ordered before dark, and was placed in reserve in two lines to the left of the Plank road, in the rear of the right of General Williams' division and in front of the division artillery, the right of each line resting on the road.⁽¹³⁾

    In early May in this region (and prior to the use of Daylight Savings Time), dawn broke well before 5:00 a.m. When daylight came, the Confederates attacked hard from the east. The Confederate attack quickly routed the inexperienced Third Maryland regiment, which by most accounts retreated too quickly and too early. The other regiments on the front line, however, held up against the Confederate attack, and on several occasions chased the southern troops across the breastworks. As this was occurring, the second line, of which the 115^th Pennsylvania was a part, also rushed to the front and chased the enemy across the field. For several hours, the opposing forces charged and countercharged back and forth across the breastworks which had been erected the night before.

    As is all too typical in Civil War battle reports, the accounts of the participants varied rather substantially. There was no question that the Third Maryland broke and ran at an early hour (although its commander claimed that it held its position for several hours, then "was forced from my position by superior numbers, but retired in good order to the rear"⁽¹⁴⁾). Some commanders in the remaining front line claimed that they were never driven back as long as the battle was in progress, and that any efforts by the troops on the second line actually got in the way of the regiments on the front line.⁽¹⁵⁾ Officers associated with Mott's Third Brigade on the second line (of which the 115th was a part) claimed that the first line gave way and that it was necessary for the second line to take the frontmost position.⁽¹⁶⁾

    Probably the truth of the matter is that some regiments on the front line fell back eventually and were replaced by those on the second line, and at the same time, one or more of the regiments on the second line charged through those on the front.

    At this point, there was still a chance that despite everything that had gone wrong, the Union might still be able to win the battle. As time went on, however, the regiments at the front began to run out of ammunition, and the assistance they needed from other parts of the Union Army simply was not forthcoming. The Chancellorsville engagement would become one of the worst losses of the Union army.

    The commander of the Second Division, of which Mott's Third Brigade and the 115^th Pennsylvania were a part, was General Hiram G. Berry. General Berry was killed at the front, and his replacement was supposed to be General Joseph Carr. However, pending Carr's ability to give orders, this authority was assumed by the division's Chief of Staff, Captain John S. Poland. Poland claimed that when the Third Maryland made its premature withdrawal, he ordered the 115^th Pennsylvania to take its place on the front line, "but in vain."⁽¹⁷⁾ If this happened, it is not necessarily surprising. As far as anyone, including Poland, knew at the time, General Berry was still in command, and it is doubtful that a division chief of staff holding the rank of captain was recognized as having the authority to issue troop movement orders on the field. Indeed, shortly after this incident and even after the demise of General Berry was known, Captain Poland reported that he tried to order the 11th New Jersey forward, but that "my authority was questioned at an untimely moment."⁽¹⁸⁾ Even if the 115th was a bit hesitant to enter the battle on Poland's orders, the regiment's extensive casualties left no doubt that it soon became heavily engaged.

    According to Major John P. Dunne, who assumed command of the regiment when Colonel Lancaster was killed,

we advanced about 20 yards, and lay down under the brow of a hill to support the First Division, Third Corps, that lay immediately behind the breastworks. The enemy soon after daylight advanced and drove the First Division, Third Corps, away from the breastworks, when my regiment advanced with the brigade and drove the enemy.

My regiment alone captured about 200 prisoners and sent them to the rear, and aided in capturing five stand of colors (I claim two of these colors for my regiment). My regiment crossed the breastworks and still drove the enemy, when they were strongly re-enforced, when we were compelled to retire with the brigade. We rallied again and drove the enemy, when we finally had to retire on account of the severe loss of officers and men.⁽¹⁹⁾

At daylight on the morning of the 3d, the first line was attacked, and after maintaining its position for an hour, was driven back upon its supports. The second line [which included the 115th] was then ordered to advance. With alacrity it sprang forward, driving the enemy, when Colonel Lancaster fell, pierced through the temple by a minié ball, the command devolving on Major Dunne. Without faltering, the line pressed forward, re-capturing the breast-works, and taking four hundred prisoners and two stands of colors. Not satisfied with this success, it crossed the works and pushed the enemy back through the woods in front. Here he was strongly reinforced, and returning to the charge, drove the brigade back about four hundred yards, where it rallied to the support of Dimick's Battery, of the First Regulars. Emboldened by his temporary success, he came on, to within two hundred yards of Dimick's guns, when the brigade, though fearfully decimated, charged and drove him back into the woods again. Again he advanced, and again he was driven before the steady fire and cool courage of the men of this brigade. The position was held against the desperate efforts made to carry it, and the guns faithfully protected until relieved, when it retired a short distance to the rear. The regiment had not rested long before it was again ordered to the front, where a new line of battle having been formed. . . .⁽²⁰⁾

Here, on a beautiful Sunday morning, on the 3d of May, 1863, the regiment, under command of Colonel Lancaster, who had joined us a short time previously, was ordered into the fight. The troops pressed forward, captured the breastworks, took four hundred rebel prisoners and two stand of colors. Here Lancaster fell, pierced through the head by a minie ball, and here also fell the brave Captains Connelly, Cromley and Dillon, and on the breastworks during the frightful conflict the canteen hanging by my side was shot through by a hissing ball. This memento of that scene of blood and carnage is one of my precious souvenirs. It is not much, it is only an old worn out canteen, and would probably have little interest to any one else, but every time I look upon its pierced side it calls afresh to my mind the many hair-breadth escapes we encountered and how often we were treading upon the very border line that separates this life from the great unknown.⁽²¹⁾

    Finally, General Sickles had this to say about this desperate effort by two of his brigades (Mott's brigade was the one which included the 115th Pennsylvania):

The Third (Mott's) Brigade, Second Division, after the retreat of the Third Maryland Regiment, moved forward to the breastwork, by command of General Mott, and drove the enemy back upon himself with incalculable slaughter. The Fifth New Jersey advanced into the woods beyond the line of breastworks, capturing many prisoners and colors. The Seventh New Jersey on the left vied with the Fifth in repelling the rebel masses.

* * *

It was here that the First Brigade (Franklin's), of the Third Division, vied with the Third Brigade (Mott's), Second Division, in its repeated assaults upon the enemy. Charge after charge was made by this gallant brigade, under Colonel Sewell, Fifth New Jersey, upon whom the command devolved (after the loss of General Mott and Colonel Park, Second New York Volunteers, wounded), before it was withdrawn, terribly reduced and mutilated, from the post assigned it. Its stern resistance to the impulsive assaults of the enemy, and the brilliant charges made in return, were worthy of the "Old Guard."⁽²²⁾

    This writer has examined the lists in Bates, History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, as well a handwritten list of the regiment's Chancellorsville casualties which is at the Pennsylvania State Archives. The combination of these two lists shows the same total (111), but with a slightly different breakdown: 22 killed or mortally wounded, 76 wounded, and 13 missing. These 111 individuals are listed by name in the Appendix to this chapter. Several weeks after the battle, Major Dunne commended sixteen members of the regiment for "distinguished and gallant services in the face of the enemy." These sixteen, and Dunne's comments, are listed below:
 
 

Name	Rank	Co.	Remarks
Thomas E. Stevens	Adjt.		Wounded in breast and shoulder
Richard Dillon	Capt.	B	Lost left arm
William A. Reilly	Capt.	E	Wounded in leg but would not leave the field
William J. Ashe	1st Lt.	C	Wounded in leg (severely)
James Malloy	2d Lt.	B	Wounded in back (severely)
John L. Jefferies	2d Lt.	G	Wounded in hand severely
R.L. Thompson	Capt.	F	Wounded in neck at Bristow
Robert M. Jefferies	2d Lt.	F	[No remarks]
Michael Connelly	1st Sgt.	F	[No remarks]
William J. Thompson	Sgt.	I	Wounded in leg
Patrick Kenney	Cpl.	E	[No remarks]
Jacob B. Meily	1st Sgt.	G	[No remarks]
Adam B. Zellar	Cpl.	G	[No remarks]
Smith McDonald	Cpl.	G	Wounded in breast (severely)
Patrick Walsh	Pvt.	B	Wounded while taking a stand of rebel colors
Fentin Lynch	Pvt.	B	[No remarks]

Colonel Sewell of the 5th New Jersey,. who succeeded to field command when General Mott was wounded, offered these high compliments for the brigade's efforts:

To mention any number of officers in this brigade for gallant conduct would be an injustice to the whole, where all behaved so nobly. To have fought with this brigade on May 3 is an honor which time cannot efface, and the proud satisfaction of having performed their duty to their manhood, their country, and their God is their reward.⁽²⁴⁾

1. O.R. I, 25(1), p. 474 (Report of Col. William J. Sewell, Fifth New Jersey Infantry, commanding Third Brigade).

2. O.R. I, 25(1), pp. 481-82 (Report of Maj. Dunne).

3. Bellard, p. 210.

4. O.R. I, 25(2), p. 545.

5. Id., p. 554.

6. John Bigelow, Jr., Chancellorsville, p. 174 (Yale University Press, 1910).

7. Bigelow, p. 175.

8. O.R. I, 25(2), p. 546.

9. Bellard, p. 211.

10. Id.

11. Id.

12. O.R. I, 25(1), p. 487.

13. O.R. I, 25(1), p. 390 (Report of General Sickles).

14. O.R. I, 25(1), p. 703 (Report of Lt. Col. Robinson, commanding Third Maryland).

15. Thus, for instance, the report of the commander of the 123d New York, which was immediately to the left of the Third Maryland, stated the following: "Three times were the enemy repulsed, and fled back from our fire, our fire never ceasing except when the men of the Third Brigade [which would have included the 115th Pennsylvania] came in front in pursuit of the enemy that were retreating from us. This movement on the part of the Third Brigade much embarrassed my men, for they were soon driven back, and as they came straggling back to our front it stopped our fire upon the enemy, who were following them. While the Third Brigade was thus engaged in our front, I was called upon to charge over our breastworks to relieve them. . . ." O.R. I, 25(1), p. 705 (Report of Col. Archibald L. McDougall, 123d New York Infantry).

16. Sickles' description is as follows: "The Third (Mott's) Brigade, Second Division, after the retreat of the Third Maryland Regiment, moved forward to the breastwork, by command of General Mott, and drove the enemy back upon himself with incalculable slaughter." O.R. I, 25(1), p. 391 (Report of General Sickles, commanding Third Corps).

17. O.R. I, 25(1), p. 450 (Report of Captain Poland, Chief of Staff, Third Corps, Second Division).

18. Id. These incidents and another one which occurred at Gettysburg leave the impression that Poland was the kind of subordinate officer who tended to be full of himself.

19. Id., p. 482 (Report of Major Dunne).

20. Bates, History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-1865, Vol. VI, p. 1210 (1869).

21. Speech printed in Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, Vol. __, p. 611. Captain Seltzer (1837-1917) went on to be admitted to the bar in 1865, and practiced in Lancaster County, Pa. until his death. (Ancestry World Tree No. 52744.)

22. O.R. I, 25(1), p. 391, 392 (Report of General Sickles).

23. Id., p. 482 (Report of Major Dunne). The same totals are listed elsewhere in the Official Reports.

24. O.R. I, 25(1), p. 474 (Report of Col. William J. Sewell, Fifth New Jersey Infantry, commanding Third Brigade).