Moving Toward Merger
(August 1863 through April 1864)
As the regiment settled once again into camp at the end of
July 1863, its few remaining members must have wondered whether the unit could
withstand another major battle. Past events probably gave the men some reason
to hope that a major engagement would not occur for some time, the time between
major battles having often been quite long in the past. Such a hope would have
been correct. It was not until nine months later, early May 1864, that another
general engagement occurred. The intervening months were not completely devoid
of action, as will be seen. But the small size of the regiment and the relative
inexperience of its officers meant that an eventual merger with another
regiment was inevitable.
As soon as the regiment was settled in camp in late July,
Col. Dunne completed his report on the 115th's activities at Gettysburg. The
only reason this date is noteworthy is that on August 18, 1863, just a few
weeks later, a letter was written by Maj. Theodore W. Baker of the 6th New
Jersey, who is listed in the letter as commanding the 115th Pennsylvania.(1) Presumably the only reason
for this is that Col. Dunne was probably absent with leave.
Another letter written during this time in camp went from
Lt. Robert Jefferies to his nephew. He stated that
Since my return to camp last April
[1863], I participated in the two hardest battles of the war[:] Chancellorsville
and Gettysburg. The former I have given you a hasty description. The latter I
will not attempt to describe on paper.(2)
The last sentence is intriguing.
Was the Battle of Gettysburg as he saw it too gruesome to describe, or did
someone do something which would best be left unsaid on paper? Unfortunately,
we have nothing else to indicate what Lt. Jefferies may have meant.
The
months of August and September 1863 appear to have been completely devoid of
activity for the 115th Pennsylvania. There were many skirmishes between the two
sides over this period, but most were probably cavalry skirmishes that never
escalated. During this period of inactivity, President Lincoln, as he usually
did, urged that the army begin offensive moves against Lee to test his
strength. Few such moves were made, however, and all remained quiet until early
October, when General Lee again sought to go on the offensive.
Essentially, Lee was hoping again to march around the Union
Army, in much the same way and much the same location as had occurred a year
before in the Second Bull Run campaign. Indeed, for a time it appeared that
there would be a Third Battle of Bull Run.
The 115th Pennsylvania was in motion a few days before
General Lee started north. The regiment had left its camp near Culpeper early
in the morning on October 8th in support of cavalry troops which were on
patrol. The Union troops proceeded a few miles west of Culpeper to James City,
a very small community which is not on present-day road maps.(3) After waiting there for two days, the Union forces were
discovered by the Confederates on October 10. The Union infantry pickets fell
back, and the infantry troops were then treated to a view of the ensuing
cavalry battle (according to Jefferies, "we were on a high hill and could
see every movement"). A Confederate battery opened fire on the Union
troops, apparently to no effect, and there were several advances and
retirements by the cavalry troops of both sides. Eventually, enough Union
troops showed up as to create a situation which "the Johnnys could not
stand, so they skedaddled and our boys pulled the artillery away."(4)
In the meantime, on October 9, the Bristoe Campaign began
when Lee's army left camp below the Rapidan and began marching north once more.
Late in the evening of October 10, after the cavalry skirmish described above,
the 115th Pennsylvania and its division were ordered back to Culpeper. They
arrived there at about 3:00 on the morning of October 11, to find "the
camps lighted up and every thing in a stir." The Union troops were about
to start back up the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, barely staying
ahead of the advancing Confederates. The entire cavalry skirmish of the day
before had been intended as a distraction to mask the northward movement of the
Confederate army.
The contrast between moving into possible action and simply
staying in camp is shown by the kind of evening the 115th Pennsylvania had on
October 10th and 11th. They marched several miles back to camp at Culpeper,
arriving at 3:00 a.m., then were told to "lay down and take all the rest
we could."(5) This was
not much: at 4:30 a.m., the order was given to fall in, and marching eventually
began again.(6) True to the
"hurry up and wait" nature of army life, the soldiers who were
ordered to fall in at 4:30 a.m. did not actually begin marching until five
hours later.(7)
The march started out in a northwesterly direction on
Sperryville pike, then turned at Pendleton's into a by-road leading to
Welford's Ford of Hazel River, a tributary of the North Fork of the Rapidan
River. The division was massed at the ford, then crossed on the pontoon bridge
of six boats shortly after dark, and followed the ridge road leading to
Freeman's Ford, on the Hedgeman River. The division waded across Freeman's Ford
at about 5:00 p.m. The overall direction of the march had been to the
northeast.
On the following day, Monday, October 12, the division
appears to have meandered somewhat, but eventually bivouacked near the road
leading to Beverly Ford, with orders to conceal camp and be ready for a sudden
movement. It was anticipated that the army might advance on short notice to
attempt to reoccupy Brandy Station.
The next day started out in comical fashion. The Second
Division did not receive the order of march for the day from corps
headquarters. At 7:00 a.m., General Prince sent a messenger to Third Corps
headquarters, only to find that it had packed up and moved. As a result,
General Prince had to find General Meade in order to find out where to go. When
the division got near Fayetteville, it overtook the Second Corps and passed
that corps with its permission. Eventually the division reached Three-Mile
Station, on the Warrenton Branch Railroad, about 3 p.m., and formed line of
battle on the left of the Third Division, facing Warrenton. Not long after
this, the division was ordered to continue marching toward Greenwich, a
crossroads town several miles west of Bristoe Station. The division arrived at
Greenwich at 3:00 a.m. and started to go into bivouac there.
The bivouac effort did not last long, because at 4:00 a.m.
on October 14, a mere hour after the march had stopped, it was ordered to
resume. Unlike the many instances where hours passed between the order to march
and the start of actual marching, this time the march started immediately. The
march headed east, toward Bristoe Station. From there the division moved over
Manassas Plains to the railroad station at Manassas Junction. Then it took the
Centreville road, fording Bull Run at about 3 p.m., and was ordered to go into
camp. At dark, the division was ordered to the high ground between Centreville and
Bull Run, when it bivouacked for the night. Because the Third Corps was not
last in the line of march, it was past Bristoe Station when the Confederates
made an unsuccessful attack on the Second Corps.
On the following day, October 15, the 115th Pennsylvania had
a rare experience of complete satisfaction with the outcome of an engagement
with the Confederates. The day began with orders to march eastwardly toward
Union Mills, an area on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad just above where the
railroad crossed Bull Run. As the division marched in this direction, it was
ordered to detach a brigade and a section of Napoleon guns to McLean's Ford, a
ford across Bull Run not far above where the railroad crossed. The brigade so
chosen was General Mott's Third Brigade, which included the 115th Pennsylvania.
Also sent to McLean's Ford was a portion of Battery K, 4th U.S. Artillery.(8)
When the brigade arrived at McLean's Ford, General Mott was
informed that his flanks would be connect with the portions of the Second and
Third Corps, although this never was actually completed. In the meantime,
General Mott positioned the 115th Pennsylvania and the 6th New Jersey in some
old rifle pits on the north side of Bull Run. Pickets were sent out from the
6th New Jersey, and they ventured out well south of Bull Run. This area in
front of the brigade and on the south side of Bull Run was described by General
Mott as a large plain.
At about 2:30 in the afternoon, Confederate cavalry emerged
onto the plain. The cavalrymen dismounted and tried to drive in the pickets
from the 6th New Jersey. These pickets were strengthened somewhat and also were
supported by both the 115th Pennsylvania and the 6th New Jersey in the rifle
pits, but eventually the Union pickets were outnumbered and had to retreat back
to the rifle pits. At this point, Confederate artillery opened fire on the
rifle pits, as well as on the rest of the Third Brigade, which was stationed on
higher ground above the ford.
The dismounted Confederates advanced in force on Bull Run,
letting loose the Rebel yell as they advanced. The Confederates no doubt
expected an easy advance, but as General Mott put it, the Confederate charges
“were repulsed handsomely by my men in the rifle-pits.”(9) Part of the 5th New Jersey, although not in
the rifle pits, assisted.
Unofficial firsthand accounts of actions by the 115th
Pennsylvania are practically nonexistent, or at least have not yet been found
by this writer, so it is worthwhile to quote in full the account of this action
by Lt. Robert M. Jefferies in a letter written about a month later:
[On the] 15th moved down to
McClain's ford on Bull Run Creek to dispute the enemy's crossing. Our Regiment
covered the ford. The Johnnys advanced and came up to the ford and were about
to cross when we opened on them, and a little surprised, they fell back to the
bushes. We fought them for nearly three hours. Our ammunition then gave out,
and Johnny gave out too. He vamoused. We had two wounded. The Rebs had one
Colonel and 16 men killed and a great many wounded. Our Brig. Gen. (Mott) said
we immortalized a name for ourselves and called us "Philadelphia
Tigers."(10)
Jefferies' letter is consistent with Mott's report on the
engagement, although Mott reported that the engagement lasted only two hours,
and that the enemy had about 60 wounded. In his report, Mott called attention
once again to the reduced state of these regiments. He noted that "my
command can hardly be called a brigade, although consisting of five regiments.
The field return showed on the morning of the action but 691 muskets."(11)
The Confederates who had made this attack consisted of two
brigades of cavalry (Lomax's and Wickham's), both part of General Fitzhugh
Lee's cavalry division. The more positive-thinking Confederate officers
reported that they drove the Union troops back across Bull Run, but the more
frank reports indicated that the Confederate attempt to advance farther north
was rendered a failure. Thus, for instance, Lt. Col. Ridgely Brown of the Third
Maryland Cavalry reported that "we had a hot skirmish with the enemy for
an hour, but finding it impossible to dislodge him we retired."(12) Another Confederate
Officer, Col. Thomas H. Owen, commanding Wickham's cavalry brigade, noted that
"Breathed's battery suffered heavily in the last-mentioned engagement,
being exposed to an enfilading and cross-fire from the enemy's batteries on the
heights beyond Bull Run, but, nevertheless, Breathed did splendid work. The
artillery and infantry fire both were quite heavy, and a number of our men were
wounded."(13)
This approach to Bull Run by the Confederates may have been
a “little high water mark” of this campaign, that is, the farthest northern
penetration of the Confederates. General Meade quickly fortified the
advantageous natural position held by troops such as the Third Brigade. The
strong natural advantage of the Union position, coupled with the lack of forage
for horses and the ruined railroad which lay to the south, caused General Lee
to decide on the following day to turn south and return the way he had come.
From the standpoint of the 115th Pennsylvania, this was for
once a completely satisfactory engagement. The regiment enjoyed a superior
geographic position, and there were no command miscues as had so often been the
case in the past. From the larger standpoint of the Union Army, this entire
campaign amounted to little more than an attempt by Lee to bully Meade's forces
out of Virginia without giving battle.
After the engagement at Bull Run on October 15, the next few
weeks were spent going back down the tracks to the place where the march had
begun. Union reports and correspondence during these days indicates a
continuing concern that a Confederate attack might be brewing, but in fact the
Confederates were interested only in getting safely back to where they had come
from.
The
itinerary of the regiment over the next several weeks is as follows:
October 16: Third
Brigade rejoined Second Division at Union Mills
October 17: The division was reviewed in parade by
General Sickles, former commander of the Third Corps who had lost a leg at
Gettysburg.
October 19: The division marched at daylight in
the direction of Bristoe Station, bivouacking on the south side of Canon Run
and east of the railroad.
October 20: The division marched at 6 a.m. toward
Buckland Mills, then went into bivouac about a mile from Greenwich toward
Auburn.
October 21: The march was resumed at 7 a.m. for
the vicinity of Catlett's Station. Bivouac occurred east of the railroad across
Cedar Run.
October 26: After staying at the same location for
several days, the division was ordered across to the north side of Cedar Run on
the west side of the railroad, and was put on alert for several hours.
October 30: The division marched from Catlett's
Station to the heights of Licking Run. This location was several miles below
the railroad spur to Warrenton.(14)
The Union army remained
at this spot for the next week.
On November 7, the Third Corps moved southward toward
Kelly's Ford on the Rappahannock River. The troops began at 5:00 a.m., and by
noon that day had marched 17 miles to Mount Holly Church near the river.(15)
The Union army quickly captured the ford, moving so rapidly
that even the Confederate pickets were unable to escape. The Union artillery
provided substantial support for this effort. The Confederates lost at least 40
dead and nearly 400 captured.
A diagram in the Official Reports (Vol. 29(1), p. 557)
indicates that the Second Division of the Third Corps was in the rear of this
advance, so there was probably little active role for the 115th Pennsylvania in
this engagement. Lieutenant Jefferies noted the condition of the Confederate
prisoners, writing as follows:
We crossed the Rappahannock again
at Kelly ford on the 7th of this month. We took a good many prisoners. Most of
them were barefooted. Their clothes were nearly worn into shreds. They seemed
totally demoralized. They came in and gave themselves up in squads. They say
they had no coffee for the last eighteen months and many have not seen any for
two years.(16)
This underscores the fact that two
things, coffee and tobacco, were never far from the soldiers' minds. Union
soldiers typically had coffee in abundance but limited supplies of tobacco,
while Confederates were usually well supplied with tobacco, but as Jefferies'
letter indicates, they had great difficulty coming up with coffee. During long
encampments, it was not unusual for the soldiers of the opposing sides to trade
tobacco and coffee back and forth across the picket lines.
Having secured Kelly's Ford, General Meade did not press
hastily forward, believing that it would take at least five days to put the
railroad in decent enough shape for the army to advance.(17) The two armies thus went into camp on
opposite sides of the Rapidan. The camp of the Third Corps was positioned at
Brandy Station, a mile or so south of the Rappahannock. The armies remained
encamped for the next several weeks.
Lieutenant Jefferies reported that “we threw up log huts but
think we will soon have to move them. We expect orders to move every day. I
think we will go as far as Culpeper again.”(18) On November 17, a day after this was
written, General Meade had issued orders to all corps commanders to be ready to
move on short notice. Three days later, when no movement had yet taken place,
General Meade was still waiting for the railroad to be restored to good working
order so that the army could be fully supplied before starting out again. He
correctly concluded that Lee "is awaiting an advance on my part."(19) Rainy weather delayed
the departure for several more days. Finally, on Thanksgiving Day, November 26,
the troops moved out, and what was to be known as the Mine Run campaign got
under way.
General Meade's plan for this campaign was to cross the
Rapidan River at a number of different fords and to attack the Confederate
right flank. Weighing in the Union's favor were both the proposed speed of the
operation and the two-to-one numerical advantage which the Union had, and which
was known to General Meade.
This plan unfortunately failed in its execution, probably
because the Third Corps commander, General French, made a number of errors. He
was late in arriving at his designated ford (Jacob's Ford), and once he arrived
there was slow to cross. He was unable to get his artillery horses across at
this ford, so he sent them downriver to Germanna Ford, where they made an
existing traffic jam worse. The next day he took a wrong turn and had to countermarch.
All of this meant that after two days, the Union movements were a full day
behind. On the third day, General French moved his troops through wooded areas
where no opposition was expected; this area was part of the Wilderness, which
was prominent both in Chancellorsville and in later battles. The delays,
however, had given General Lee the opportunity to move some of his troops to
meet the Third Corps, and a skirmish had to be fought in order for the Corps to
advance.
Rainy weather and traffic jams of the march traffic caused
more delays. By November 30, the Confederates had had time to entrench and wait
to be attacked. The tactical situation bore a strong resemblance to
Fredericksburg, so the Confederates were no doubt hoping to see Union troops moving
in on their dug-in positions. In this they were disappointed. General Meade had
a level of self-confidence which had been lacking in Burnside, who felt that he
must attack at Fredericksburg. Seeing that attacking the Confederate position
would destroy much of his army, General Meade on December 1 ordered a retreat.
By the next day, the Union troops were back where they had started, and the
Mine Run campaign, which had held so much promise in its planning, was over.
For the 115th Pennsylvania, the Mine Run campaign was little
more than an exercise in marching. The regiment and its brigade were “not . . .
engaged with the enemy at any time during the movement,” according to brigade
commander Gersham Mott.(20)
Such little action as the 115th saw occurred on November 29, when they were
behind the 7th New Jersey. The commander of that regiment stated that the 7th
New Jersey drove "some few of the enemy's pickets away," then
continued with more skirmishing.(21)
When the 115th Pennsylvania relieved the 7th New Jersey as skirmishers in the
latter part of the day, it got to the road it was seeking to take "without
meeting the enemy."(22)
The rest of the campaign was the same for the regiment as it was for the Union
army as a whole, ending with the retreat to the original camp near Brandy
Station on December 2. This was the beginning of what would be a five-month
rest.
In the meantime, a few other letters had gone out from the
115th Pennsylvania. In the early fall, then-Major Dunne wrote Pennsylvania
Governor Curtin seeking a promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.(23) Dunne noted that he was the only field
officer left in the regiment, and that he had been present in all the action
seen by the regiment. He repeated his claim that “I saved the steamboat
Juniata” in 1862. In discussing his role at Gettysburg, he made a claim he had
first made in his official report, that is, that “I kept it fighting long after
the brigade to which it was attached returned from the field.” Of course, the
brigade was in at least three different parts of the field, facing different
levels of action, so this claim may be said to be somewhat embellished. No
record of official action on Dunne's request has been found, but the promotion
clearly came through, because by mid-November, he was signing letters as Lt.
Col. Dunne. Later events make it clear that the regiment would have been much
better off if it had been able to find another commander, but such was not the
system of organization at the time.
Dunne also recommended some others for promotion. These
recommendations were as follows:
Captain William A. Reilly, Co.
E, to Major
Lieutenant William S. Ashe. Co. C, to Captain
Lieutenant Peter Byrne, Co. A, to Captain
Lieutenant Robert M. Jefferies, Co. F, to Captain
1st Sergeant Michael Connelly, Co. B, to 1st Lieutenant
It is uncertain whether Reilly and Connelly were promoted
when the Governor acted on these recommendations on November 13, 1863, but the
other three apparently did receive promotions.
Also in November, not long before the Mine Run campaign
began, Dunne asked permission to send a recruiting party home.(24) He noted that the regiment was “sadly
decimated by the ravages of disease and the battle-field.” The New Jersey
regiments comprising the rest of the brigade had been permitted to send
recruiting parties home, he pointed out. Finally, he said that the regiment had
only 136 enlisted men and 7 company officers. Nothing appears to have come from
this letter, although in all likelihood, recruitment in Philadelphia probably
would not have been successful anyway.
Still seeking to augment his ranks, Dunne wrote the Adjutant
General again a few weeks later.(25)
This time he was willing to accept conscripts. He noted that the regiment had
only “96 muskets for line of battle.” This is not inconsistent with his earlier
indication of 136 enlisted men, because many enlisted men were not line
fighters. Again, nothing much seems to have resulted from Dunne's efforts.(26)
The Union army as a whole did little from December 1863
through April 1864 except remain in its camp near Brandy Station. In March,
General Grant was sent east to try to increase the army's momentum. Also in
March, the Third Corps, which had enjoyed a special identity since at least the
Peninsula Campaign but was now reduced in numbers, was cut down to the level of
a division and moved to the Second Corps. It was permitted to retain its badges
and other distinctive marks. A hollow promise was made to separate it again if
recruitment should increase its numbers. The 115th Pennsylvania remained in the
same brigade as the New Jersey regiments.
During the latter part of this period of inactivity, one of
the worst events in the regiment's history occurred. Probably as a result of a
visible lack of discipline, the regiment fell out of favor with Brigadier
General Mott. Mott asked that a board of review be convened to examine the
"qualifications, propriety of conduct, and efficiency" of the
officers of the 115th Pennsylvania, as well as "the general condition of
the regiment."(27)
Mott proposed that the inefficient officers should be mustered out, and the
regiment consolidated with the another one from Pennsylvania. He noted that of
16 officers and 250 enlisted men on the roll, only 8 officers and 106 men were
present for duty.
Mott's request was returned a few days later, with a request
that he list the officers he thought to be inefficient. His response was that
"there are no officers in this regiment that I consider efficient."
He also asked specifically that the unit be combined with the 26th
Pennsylvania. His superior, General Carr, was still not satisfied, and
requested that Mott give the names of the inefficient officers. Mott responded
by sending the entire roster of the officers of the 115th.
Once these preliminaries were finally out of the way, the
regiment's officers appeared before the board of inquiry on April 12, 1864. Lt.
Col. Dunne was the first officer examined. The board concluded that Dunne
"had some knowledge of tactics, but appears to be a very poor executive
officer, and incapable of enforcing discipline in his regiment."(28) (The original colonel,
Robert Patterson, had proven prophetic when he said over a year before that
Dunne "is not fit for any position higher than the one that he now
occupies [i.e., captain]. The men do not respect him and would be disgusted
were he promoted."(29))
Continuing its condemnation of Dunne, the board concluded that he had been a
lieutenant colonel since October 1863, but "has had but one battalion
drill since that time and is never present at company or squad
drills." A number of other officers were examined by the board; none were
found qualified.
At the board's proceedings, the brigade's inspector general
reported that the 115th Pennsylvania's "discipline [was] lax, camp in fair
order, clothing, quarters, etc., in bad condition. At every inspection
this regiment is found much worse than any other in the brigade." The
board itself then proceeded to inspect the regiment, and found it to be
"in an undisciplined and filthy condition."
These sad proceedings came to a close on April 15, when the
board issued its written order to the effect that "the wretched state of
the 115th Penna. vol. Regt. is owing entirely to the incompetency of its
officers, and the board respectfully recommend that they be mustered out of the
U.S. Service." As will be seen in the next chapter, two more months were
to elapse before this actually took place, and not all the officers left the
service. At the same time the officers were mustered out, the regiment was
merged with the 110th Pennsylvania. In the meantime, however, the regiment
retained its identity through the major battles of the spring of 1864.
At the
same time, other changes were coming to the larger organizational structure. The
casualties of two years’ worth of battles had greatly reduced the original several
corps of the Army of the Potomac. Accordingly, after considerable debate and
discussion, an order of President Lincoln in late March 1864 abolished the
First and Third Corps, merging them into the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps. The
next day, an order of General Meade transferred the Third Corps’ First and
Second Divisions (the latter including the 115th Pennsylvania) to General
Hancock’s Second Corps. The former Third Corps units were permitted to retain
their “badges and distinctive marks.” Members of the two corps that had been
deactivated were naturally not happy with the loss of their unit identity,
leading Meade to note that “the reasons for attaching the First and Third
Corps, for the time being, to other corps were in no respect founded upon any
supposed inferiority of those corps to the other corps of this army. All the
corps have equally proved their valor on many fields, and all have equal claims
to the confidence of the Government and of the country.” Meade’s mention of
“for the time being” turned out to be a vain hope. The Third Corps ceased to
exist forever once it was merged into the Second.
As
complimentary as these words of Meade’s were, they may not have been completely
factual. Major Henry L. Abbott, of the Second Corps’ “Harvard Regiment” (20th
Massachusetts), inspected the picket lines of the former Third Corps divisions
now in the Second Corps, and found that “the condition of these lines was
infamous, as bad as the picket duty on the Potomac three years ago.” Abbott,
who was to die about six weeks later in the Battle of the Wilderness, went on
to detail the alleged inferiority of the new additions in a number of
particulars. How much of this was truthful, and how much was simply a matter of
unit pride, cannot now be discerned.
The
Second Corps as constituted after the merger had about 90 regiments in it, and
a total of about 24,000 officers and men present, an average of a little over
250 present per regiment. With only 112 present in late April 1864, the 115th
Pennsylvania was still one of the smaller units in a corps made up of small
units. The number of 112 present was only about one-fourth of the total present
before the regiment saw its first real action at Second Manassas in late August
1862.
A
number of other personnel-related matters were rumbling through the camps at
this same time. The most serious was that the three-year terms of enlistment of
the first fervent volunteers of 1861 were about to expire. In the Army of the
Potomac, of those whose terms were almost up, only about a quarter re-enlisted.
The rest of the ranks were filled primarily by the conscripts who were so
unpopular. Whatever disruption this may have caused in general, it did not
directly affect the 115th Pennsylvania. The enlistments of the men in that unit
would not begin to expire until November. The regiment was likewise free from
the disruptions caused by incoming recruits or conscripts because there were
practically no enlistments or other additions to the regiment after it took the
field in the middle of 1862. Only three new men joined the regiment in the
whole of 1863, and only thirteen more came in during the first few months of
1864.
Besides
using conscripts and veteran volunteers, Grant obtained some more troops
through reassigning soldiers who were guarding Washington back to the field. Unlike
the importation of the conscripts, this movement of men from safe and
comfortable positions to battlefield units was quite popular with those who had
already been in camp for so many months.
In
terms of unit organization, the 115th Pennsylvania found itself in essentially
the same brigade as always, that is, with the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th New Jersey
regiments. Most of the non-New Jersey regiments that had been with the brigade
earlier were removed, but other regiments took their place. The brigade’s former commander, General
Gersham Mott, had been promoted to command of the Fourth Division of the Second
Corps; Colonel Robert McAllister of the 11th New Jersey took Mott’s place as
brigade commander. McAllister’s
regiment, the 11th New Jersey, was added to the brigade, as were the 1st and
16th Massachusetts and the 26th Pennsylvania.
Robert
McAllister, the new brigade commander, was born in 1813 in Juniata County,
Pennsylvania. By 1862, he had
risen to become Colonel of the 11th New Jersey. He was a railroad construction engineer before the war. He was deeply religious, and consistent
with the views of many of the deeply religious of that era, was a teetotaler.
He possessed undisputed bravery and coolness under fire, and was wounded twice.
Robert McAllister, 1813-1891
After
the war, McAllister returned to the railroad business, this time as manager of
the Ironton Railway. He died on
February 23, 1891, in Belvidere New Jersey. A collection of McCallister’s Civil
War letters was published in 1965.
The
115th’s place in the spring 1864 reorganization is shown below:
ARMY OF
THE POTOMAC
Maj. Gen.
George G. Meade
SECOND
ARMY CORPS
Maj. Gen.
Winfield S. Hancock
FOURTH
DIVISION.
Brig. Gen.
Gershom Mott.
FIRST
BRIGADE.
Col. Robert
McAllister.
1st
Massachusetts, Col. Napoleon B. McLaughlen.
16th
Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Waldo Merriam.
5th New
Jersey, Col. William J. Sewell.
6th New
Jersey, Lieut. Col. Stephen R. Gilkyson.
7th New
Jersey, Maj. Frederick Cooper.
8th New
Jersey, Col. John Ramsey.
11th New
Jersey, Lieut. Col. John Schoonover.
26th
Pennsylvania, Maj. Samuel G. Moffett.
115th
Pennsylvania, Maj. William A. Reilly.
_______________________
In
this configuration, the regiment prepared for the new challenges that were about
to confront it as the Army of the Potomac began the slow and tortuous approach
south to Richmond.
1. The letter speaks of the
promotion of Lt. Robert M. Jeffries (actually spelled "Jefferies") to
Captain of Company F. Major Baker stated that "I have noticed this young
officer in the last two engagements. Although a stranger to me, I must say that
he has nobly done his duty and is deserving of promotion." August 18, 1863
letter of Baker, Pa. Archives. Robert Jeffries was later killed in action at
Petersburg, Virginia, on June 16, 1864. Several of his letters have survived.
His brother John L. Jeffries also served as an officer in the 115th.
2. Letter of Robert Jefferies to
unnamed nephew, August 26, 1863. Southern Historical Collection, CB 3926,
Wilson Library, Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
3. The description of these
events as they involve the 115th Pennsylvania is taken from the November 16,
1863 letter of Robert Jefferies to "Howard" (probably a nephew).
Southern Historical Collection, CB 3926, Wilson Library, Univ. of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
6. Lt. Jefferies "found a
nice little hill to lay my head on [and] was soon sound asleep. . . . When I
awoke, . . . I thought I never had a better pillow. When I came to look at what
it was, I found it was a grave I made my pillow of."
7. O.R. 29(1), p. 314 (Report of
Brig. Gen. Henry Prince, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division).
8. The source for information
about this march up to this point is O.R. 29(1), pp. 314-316 (Report of Brig.
Gen. Henry Prince, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division).
9. O.R. 29(1), p. 330 (Report of
General Mott, commanding Third Brigade).
10. November 16, 1863 letter of
Robert Jefferies to "Howard" (probably a nephew). Southern Historical
Collection, CB 3926, Wilson Library, Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
11. O.R. 29(1), p. 331 (Report
of General Mott, commanding Third Brigade).
14. The itinerary is taken from
O.R. 29(1), pp. 316-317.
15. O.R. 29(1), p. 556 (Report
of General William H. French, commanding Left Column, Third Corps).
16. November 16, 1863 letter of
Robert Jefferies to "Howard."
17. O.R. 29(2), p. 435 (Meade
to Halleck, November 8, 1863).
18. November 16, 1863 letter of
Robert Jefferies to "Howard."
19. O.R. 29(2), p. 473 (Meade
to Halleck, November 20, 1863.
20. O.R. 29(1), p. 775 (Report
of Brig. Gen. Gersham Mott).
21. O.r. 29(1), p. 776 (Report
of Maj. Frederick Cooper, 7th New Jersey).
22. Report of Lt. Col. John P.
Dunne (National Archives).
23. Undated letter, Dunne to
Curtin. Pa. State Archives.
24. Dunne to Pa. Adjutant
General, November 16, 1863. Pa. State Archives.
25. Dunne to Pa. Adjutant
General, December 8, 1863. Pa. State Archives.
26. In one of the less
fortunate incidents which occurred at about this time, Captain R.L. Thompson of
Company F was discharged for drunkenness.
27. Mott to Assistant Adjutant
General Williams, March 21, 1864. National Archives.
28. Proceedings of the board of
examination. National Archives.
29. 12/16/62 letter, R.E.
Patterson to Gov. A.G. Curtin (Pa. State Archives).